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I. Developments in Australia
A. MERGER REGULATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
The Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) cleared a number of
high profile mergers during 2001 across a broad range of industry sectors, including the
merger of BHP Broken Hill Pty Co Limited and Billiton Pty Limited Corporation, which
had a global impact, and Singapore Telecommunications Limited's acquisition of Cable &
Wireless Optus Limited.
In the past year, the ACCC, subject to obtaining satisfactory undertakings from the
parties, allowed a number of mergers and acquisitions, which would have substantially
lessened competition. These included Qantas Airways Limited's acquisition of Impulse
Airlines Holdings Limited, which was cleared after significant undertakings were given in
relation to terminal access, pricing, and takeoff and landing slots at Sydney airport. Wool-
worths Limited's acquisition of Franklins Supermarkets Limited was also given clearance,
notwithstanding that it would have substantially lessened competition in the retail and
wholesale supermarket industry, after Woolworths undertook to divest a number of stores
across Australia.
Unusually, the "failing firm" argument was successful in a number of applications for
informal clearance submitted to the ACCC. This included Qantas/Impulse discussed above.
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B. ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL SERVICES
1. Telecommunications
On December 21, 2001, the Federal Government released the Productivity Commis-
sion's final report entitled "Telecommunications Competition Regulation."' The Produc-
tivity Commission recommended the retention of Parts XIB and MC of the Trade Practices
Act (TPA), while recommending that a number of changes be made to those Parts to
facilitate their operation.
The ACCC also commenced three public inquiries. The first is whether to make a line
sharing service a "declared service," which should facilitate competition in the provision of
broadband services to residential customers. The second relates to a possible variation to
the existing GSM originating and terminating access service to include CDMA networks.
The third involves whether the service declaration for domestic transmission services should
be varied by removing intercapital transmission as a declared service.
During 2001, a number of proceedings were brought by market participants against their
competitors primarily involving allegations of misleading and deceptive conduct. Three of
the four Federal Court cases involved conduct in the mobile telephone market.
2. Electricity
There were a number of developments in this sector in 2001, including the implemen-
tation of changes in the National Electricity Code for the introduction of full retail com-
petition and the introduction of an appropriate revenue cap to apply to the Queensland
electricity transmission network for a five and a half year period commencing January 2002.
C. PRICE FIXING
1. International Animal Vitamins Cartel
In the Federal Court decision in ACCC v Roche Vitamins Australia Pty Ltd and Others,'
Justice Lindgren imposed record penalties totalling $26 million against Roche Vitamins
Australia Pty Ltd, BASF Australia Ltd, and Aventis Animal Nutrition Pty Ltd for alleged
price fixing and market sharing in contravention of section 45 of the TPA. The conduct
was considered extremely serious, particularly given that it involved local companies giving
effect to global arrangements made by multi-national corporate groups.
2. Credit Card Interchange Fees Allegations
The ACCC commenced proceedings in 2000 against the National Australia Bank, alleg-
ing price fixing in relation to credit card interchange fees in the Visa, MasterCard, and
Bankcard schemes. A number of other banks were joined in the proceedings. Interchange
fees are the fees that banks charge for processing one another's credit card transactions.
In March 2001, the ACCC referred the matter to the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA),
recommending that it use its statutory powers to reform the credit card scheme arrange-
ments. The RBA released a consultation document in December setting out proposed re-
forms, which are expected to reduce interchange fees by several hundred million dollars
1. PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION REGULATION: INQUIRY REPORT (2001),
available at http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/telecommunications/final report/index.html.
2. ACCC v. Roche Vitamins Pty Ltd. (2001) FCA 150.
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each year and to permit merchants to recover the fees from cardholders at the point of
sale? Another proposed reform is to remove the restriction on non-authorized deposit-
taking institutions issuing Visa and MasterCard credit cards.
D. MisusE OF MARKET POWER
Section 46 of the TPA provides that a corporation with a substantial degree of power in
a market is proscribed from taking advantage of that power for a prohibited purpose. Pro-
hibited purposes include eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor, preventing
the entry of a person into any market, and deterring or preventing a person from engaging
in competitive conduct in any market.
1. Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v. Robert Hicks Pty Ltd4
The primary question for appeal before the High Court in this case concerned the mean-
ing of the phrase "taking advantage" in section 46 of the TPA. Melway did not dispute the
fact that it had substantial market power in the Melbourne street directory market. How-
ever, a simple application of the taking advantage test resulted in the lower courts' finding
that Melway had abused its market position by refusing to supply a prospective distributor.
All the members of the High Court upheld the Federal Court's finding that by refusing
to supply the prospective distributor, Melway was acting for a prohibited purpose. However,
it was found that Melway had not taken advantage of its market power. The majority found
that section 46 requires a connection between market power, the conduct, and the pro-
scribed purpose, not merely coexistence of these factors. Melway was permitted, therefore,
to refuse to supply the distributor on the basis that it could continue to act as it had done
when it did not have market power.
2. Record Company Case
In 1998, the ACCC commenced an investigation into the conduct of Universal Music
and Warner Music after complaints that they had threatened to withdraw trading benefits
from retailers who stocked parallel imported CDs and had threatened to withdraw supplies
from retailers who stocked parallel imports. Amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 were
passed in 1998 to permit parallel importation of CDs, provided those CDs were manufac-
tured with the license of the copyright owner in the country of manufacture.
Proceedings were instituted in September 1999. The ACCC's allegations included that
the defendants had breached section 46 of the TPA by taking advantage of their market
power to deter retailers from engaging in competitive conduct. In a landmark decision,
Justice Hill, writing for the court, held that a particular record company could have a
substantial degree of market power even if its market share was less than 30 percent and
that this was not an industry in which market share would be the sole determinant of market
power.' For instance, the court found that the statutory requirement of copyright proof
3. RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA, REFORM OF CREDIT CARD SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA (2001), available at
http://www.rba.gov.au/PaymentsSystem/PaymentsPolicy/CreditCardSchemes/index.html.
4. Melway Publishing Pty Ltd. v. Robert Hick Pty Ltd. (2001) HCA 13.
5. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v. Warner Music Australia Pty Ltd. (2000) FCA647;
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v. Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. (2001) FCA 1800.
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prior to parallel importation and the behavior of incumbent firms could constitute barriers
to new entry. A hearing on appropriate orders as to penalties was to be heard in early
February 2002.
E. PENALTIES
In June of 2001, the ACCC issued a media release calling for criminal sanctions, including
imprisonment, as a penalty for hard-core cases of collusion such as price-fixing, bid-rigging,
and market-sharing.' This would bring Australia into line with some of its major trading
partners such as the United States, Canada, Japan, and South Korea.
F. E-COMMERCE
In October 2001, the ACCC released a discussion paper on the competition issues arising
from electronic commerce. 7 It notes that while new technologies, distribution channels, on-
line business, B2B electronic market places, and e-procurement services have generated
economic efficiencies and created new ways of doing business, they have also generated
new modes of anti-competitive conduct. Potential trade practices issues noted included
price fixing, primary boycotts, third line forcing, misuse of market power, anti-competitive
agreements, mergers between e-hubs, market definition, and other issues such as standard
setting agreements, distribution channel management, bundling and tying arrangements
and information aggregation, and the effect of e-commerce on small business.
G. AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT
InJune 2001, the Federal Government agreed to the amendments proposed in the Trade
Practices Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2000. The definition of "market" for the purposes of
section 50 of the TPA (the prohibition on anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions) has
now been amended to include a substantial market in a region of Australia.
Major changes in the field of consumer protection included:
* Increasing fines for contravention of the provisions of Part V to a maximum monetary penalty
of 2,000 penalty units for an individual and 10,000 penalty units for a corporation (which
would currently translate into $220,000 and $1,100,000 respectively);
* Extending of the time limit for starting a court action for loss of damages from three to
six years;
* Adding new remedies, including community service orders, probation, and adverse publicity
orders; and
- Allowing the ACCC to take class actions and to intervene in private cases if the issues involve
the public interest.
6. Press Release, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC calls for Stronger Criminal
Sanctions Including Jail Sentences for Price-Fixing Offences under the Trade Practices Act (June 8, 2001),
available at http://www.accc.gov.au/media/mediar.htm.
7. E-commerce and Competition: issues under the Trade Practices Act: discussion paper, Australian Com-
petition and Consumer Commission, Oct. 2001, available at http://www.accc.gov.au/new/pdf/ecom.pdf.
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H. REVIEW OF THE ACT
The government proposes to carry out a comprehensive review of the provisions of the
TPA, which relate to restrictive trade practices and their administration., The terms of
reference of the review include whether the legislation and its administration continue to
encourage an environment where Australian businesses can grow and compete internation-
ally. The review is also expected to examine the current regime for the regulation of mergers
under the TPA and its enforcement by the ACCC. The review will have an independent
Chairman, and will report by August 2002.
II. Developments in Canada
A. COMMISSIONER REAPPOINTED
On December 7, 2001, the current Commissioner of Competition, Konrad von Finck-
enstein, was reappointed to a second five-year term. The appointment became effective
January 28, 2002.
B. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
On December 10, 2001, Bill C-23, An Act to amend the Competition Act and the Competition
Tribunal Act passed its Third Reading in the House of Commons. Unless changed by the
Senate, Bill C-23 will amend the Competition Act by:
" Creating a limited right of private action before the Competition Tribunal with respect to
sections 75 (refusal to supply) and 77 (exclusive dealing, tied selling and exclusive territories,
and other forms of market restriction). These provisions creating a right of private access to
the Tribunal were added to the bill just prior to the Second Reading at the suggestion of the
Standing Committee on Industry, after the Commissioner agreed to demands for additional
safeguards to minimize the scope for strategic litigation. These safeguards include a higher
threshold for standing, the substitution of normal cost rules for the "frivolous and vexatious"
test that originally had been proposed for cost awards, the inclusion of language to make it
clearer that damage awards cannot be granted by the Tribunal, and the elimination of double
jeopardy by preventing a party from commencing a private action if the matter is under
inquiry by the Commissioner or if the Commissioner has already taken action in respect of
the matter.
" Creating a framework for cooperation with foreign enforcement authorities in non-criminal
matters, which essentially mirrors the existing arrangements with respect to criminal matters
under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.
" Streamlining the Competition Tribunal's processes by providing for cost awards, summary
judgments, and references on consent for determinations of any question of law, mixed law
and fact, jurisdiction, practice, or procedure in relation to the non-criminal provisions of the
Competition Act. (There is a similar provision that would enable the Commissioner to bring
a reference without the consent of the parties.)
" Enabling the Competition Tribunal to issue temporary orders prior to the commencement
of litigation to prevent irreparable harm to competition or to a competitor.
" Providing the Competition Tribunal with the power to make orders for administrative mon-
etary penalties up to C$15 million when it finds that an air carrier operating a domestic
service, as defined in subsection 55(1) of the Canada Transportation Act, has engaged in a
8. Press Release, Prime Minister of Australia, Securing Australia's Prosperity (Oct. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.pm.gov.au/news/media-releases/2001/media-releasel 338.htm.
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practice of anti-competitive acts which are likely to prevent or lessen competition substan-
tially within the meaning of the abuse of dominance provisions of the Competition Act.
C. INCREASED MERGER ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY
There was a significant increase in merger enforcement activity during 2001, relative to
prior years. In two cases, the Commissioner took the rare, if not unprecedented, step of
appointing a third party to conduct divestitures. In the first of these cases, the trustee was
unable to sell the stores in question, so they reverted to the merged entity. That case
involved the acquisition of Chapters Inc., the leading Canadian book retailer, by Trilogy
Retail Enterprises L.P. The principals of Trilogy also had a significant shareholding interest
in Indigo Books & Music Inc., a key competitor of Chapters. Following Trilogy's acqui-
sition of control of Chapters, Indigo and Chapters were merged.
A consent order issued in June 2001 contained a package of measures to address the
Commissioner's competition concerns, including the divesture of thirteen large-format
bookstores, ten shopping mall stores, a distribution center, certain on-line assets of Indigo,
and up to three store brands. In addition, the parties agreed to the imposition of a Code
of Conduct that set minimum standards of trade between the merged company and pub-
lishers for a period of five years. However, after the parties were unable to sell any of the
assets to be divested, a trustee was appointed for that purpose in September 2001. InJanuary
2002, the Competition Bureau stated publicly that the period for the trustee to divest the
assets had expired without any divestitures being made and that the assets would revert
back to the merged entity.
The second case in which a third party was appointed to conduct the sale of assets
concerned Abitibi Consolidated Inc.'s acquisition of Donohue Inc. In February 2001, Ab-
itibi provided an undertaking to resolve the Commissioner's concern that its acquisition of
Donohue likely would result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition in the
supply of newsprint in Eastern Canada. As part of the settlement, Abitibi agreed to divest
its Port-Alfred newsprint mill. The undertaking also permitted the Commissioner to ap-
point an agent to sell the Port-Alfred mill if Abitibi was unable to do so within the allotted
time. As it turned out, Abitibi was unable to sell the mill, with the result that the Com-
missioner applied to the Competition Tribunal on December 17, 2001 to formalize the
February undertaking and to transfer responsibility for the divesture of the mill to an agent.
In August 2001, the Competition Tribunal issued a consent order in connection with
Lafarge S.A.'s acquisition of Blue Circle Industries plc. That order largely paralleled a
similar order obtained by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, as it related to requiring
Lafarge to sell the majority of the Canadian Blue Circle cement assets as well as related
cement and distribution assets in Canada and the United States. It may be noted that many
of the provisions of the U.S. order were incorporated into the Canadian consent order. In
addition, the Canadian consent order also contained the requirement that certain aggregates
and asphalt operations in Ontario be divested.
Notwithstanding that the Commissioner insisted on taking the foregoing cases to the
Tribunal, several other cases during the year were resolved in the more traditional and less
formal way, i.e., through undertakings. For example, in October 2001, the Competition
Bureau announced that it had reached a settlement with Diageo plc to resolve competition
concerns arising from the proposed acquisition of the Spirits and Wine Business of The
Seagram Company Limited by Diageo and Pernod Ricard S.A. In short, Diageo undertook
to divest the Gibson's Finest brand of Canadian whisky and related assets to address con-
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cerns that its purchase of the various whisky brands, including Crown Royal and Seagram's
VO, likely would result in a substantial lessening of competition in the supply of premium
Canadian whisky products in various provincial markets.
A particularly noteworthy development in the mergers area during the year was the
Federal Court of Appeal's decision in the Superior Propane case. This decision represents
the first appellate consideration of the "efficiencies defense" in section 96 of the Compe-
tition Act. The Court held that the Competition Tribunal should not have adopted a "total
surplus" interpretation of the trade-off analysis contemplated by section 96. Under that
approach, "wealth transfers" from consumers to producers are considered neutral and dis-
regarded in the determination of whether the requirements of section 96 have been met.
The Court held that section 96 requires an analysis that is "more reflective than the total
surplus standard of the different objectives of the Competition Act."9 However, rather than
substituting its own interpretation of section 96, the Court remitted the case back to the
Competition Tribunal for a re-hearing, with specific instructions to the Tribunal to take
into account all of the purposes of the Act (as opposed to just the promotion of efficiency),
including "the ability of medium and small businesses to participate in the economy, and
the availability to consumers of a choice of goods at competitive prices." 10
D. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE GUIDELINES
InJuly 2001, the Competition Bureau released its final Enforcement Guidelines on the Abuse
of Dominance Provisions (Guidelines)." The Guidelines outline the Bureau's approach to
enforcing the civil abuse of dominance provisions set forth in sections 78 and 79 of the
Competition Act. The Guidelines purport to reflect existing Tribunal jurisprudence under
section 79, as well as to articulate the Bureau's enforcement position in areas where there
is little or no jurisprudence. As with other guidelines that have been issued by the Bureau,
these Guidelines do not provide hard and fast rules for all situations.
Among other things, the Guidelines adopt the same 35 percent safe harbor articulated
in the Bureau's Merger Enforcement Guidelines2 and Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guide-
lines, 3 and adopt a 60 percent safe harbor threshold for joint dominance.14 Cases involving
firms with shares in excess of these thresholds will simply "prompt further examination,"
as opposed to giving rise to an adverse presumption regarding "market power or domi-
nance."" In contrast to the European notion of abuse of dominance, the Guidelines state
that the imposition of high prices, in and of itself, does not constitute an abuse of domi-
nance.' 6 Furthermore, the focus of the Bureau's analysis is "on competition, rather than on
individual competitors." 7 Dominance is defined as "conduct that constitutes exclusionary,
9. Comm'r of Competition v. Superior Propane Inc., 11 C.P.R. (4th) 289 at 327 (2001).
10. Id. at 315.
11. Enforcement Guidelines on the Abuse of Dominance Provisions, Competition Bureau, June 2001, available at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ctaod.pdf [hereinafter Enforcement Guidelines].
12. COMPETITION BUREAU, MERER ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES (1991), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/
SSG/ct0126e.html
13. Director of Investigation and Research, Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guidelines (1992, Supply and Ser-
vices Canada), at § 2.2.1.1.
14. Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 11, at 2.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1.
17. Id. at 3.
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disciplinary or predatory behavior towards competitors or potential competitors, with the
result that competition is prevented or lessened substantially."" Joint dominance is defined
as coordinated actions involving "something more than mere conscious parallelism," by
firms with market power. 9
E. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
On December 17, 2001, the Bureau announced that it had signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with Chile's competition agency regarding the application of their
competition laws. The MOU formalizes a cooperation arrangement built on commitments
under the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement and closely tracks the "Cooperation Ar-
rangement" between the Commissioner, the Australian Competition and Consumer Com-
mission, and the New Zealand Commerce Commission that was signed in October 2000.
Although somewhat less comprehensive in scope than the state-to-state agreements
signed with the United States in 1995 and the European Communities in 1999 (for ex-
ample, with respect to notification, coordination, cooperation, avoidance of conflict, and
confidentiality), the MOU contains provisions that are similar to many of the provisions
regarding notification, coordination, and cooperation that are set forth in those state-to-
state agreements.
This development followed the announcement of a cooperation agreement on compe-
tition law enforcement between the governments of Canada and Mexico, on November 14,
2001. For the most part, the provisions of that agreement, which has not yet received senate
approval in Mexico, are virtually identical to the 1995 Canada-U.S. cooperation agreement.
There are three noteworthy differences between the Canada-U.S. agreement and the
Canada-Mexico agreement. First, the Canada-Mexico agreement does not contain specific
provisions relating to deceptive marketing practices. Second, it includes specific provisions
relating to technical assistance. And third, it contains more streamlined provisions relating
to the confidentiality of information exchanged under the agreement. There are also some
slight differences in the provisions relating to notification.
IL. Developments in European Union
A. INTRODUCTION
During 2001, EU competition law and its application by the European Commission
attracted perhaps more attention from the media than in any previous year. This increased
interest focused mainly on the Commission's controversial decision in GE/Honeywell.2"
Commentators' interest was also attracted by a series of cartel cases in which the Com-
mission imposed exceptionally heavy fines: zinc phosphate,' vitamins (record fines of over
855 million),22 citric acid,23 graphite electrodes,24 Belgian and Luxembourg brewers,2" and
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id. at 16-17.
20. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Prohibits GE's Acquisition of Honeywell Ouly 5,
2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp200lO37-en.pdf.
21. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Fines Six Companies in Zinc Phosphate Cartel (Dec.
11, 2001) (on file with the author).
22. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Imposes Fines on Vitamin Cartels (Nov. 21, 2001)
(on file with the author).
23. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Fines Five Companies in Citric Acid Cartel (Dec.
5, 2001) (on file with the author).
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German banks.26 However, in terms of substantive developments, 2001 was a relatively quiet
year in EU antitrust law, as will be seen from the summary of legislative or quasi-legislative
measures below. The year 2001 did not see the adoption of any of the major proposals for
change in EU competition law currently under debate. For example, the project to overhaul
and modernize EC competition law was still under discussion at the end of 2001. Likewise,
the public consultation on the Green Paper relating to the review of the EC Merger Control
Regulation27 only began in December 2001.
B. EC MERGER CONTROL REGULATION
1. Merger Control Regulation-Prohibition of Conglomerate Mergers-GE/Honeywell, Tetra
Laval/Sidel
During 2001, two of the European Commission's most noteworthy decisions under the
EC Merger Control Regulation, GE/Honeywell and Tetra Laval/Sidel,28 involved the pro-
hibition of mergers on grounds relating to conglomerate or vertical effects. The Commis-
sion's prohibition decision in GE/Honeywell was particularly controversial because it con-
cerned a transaction involving two U.S. firms, and U.S. antitrust authorities did not
challenge the transaction.
In GE/Honeywell, the Commission found that GE, prior to the proposed merger, had a
dominant position in the market for jet engines for large commercial and large regional
aircraft. This finding was based not only on GE's strong market position in those markets,
but also on the combination of that market position with GE's financial strength and its
vertical integration into aircraft leasing. Honeywell, the Commission concluded, was the
leading supplier of avionics and non-avionics products, as well as of engines for corporate
jets and of engine starters.
In analysing the effects of the proposed merger, the Commission found that the com-
bination of the two companies' activities would have resulted in the creation of dominant
positions in the markets for the supply of avionics, non-avionics, and corporate jet engines,
as well as strengthening GE's existing dominance in jet engines for large commercial and
large regional jets. This dominance, the Commission found, would have resulted, in part,
from horizontal overlaps but also through the extension of GE's financial power and vertical
integration to Honeywell's activities and from the combination of the complementary prod-
ucts of each of the parties. The combined entity, the Commission concluded, would have
24. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Fines Eight Companies in Graphite Electrode Cartel
(uly 18, 2001) (on file with the author).
25. Press Release, European Commission, The Commission Fines Brewers in Market Sharing and Price
Fixing Cartels on the Belgian Market (Dec. 5, 2001) (on file with the author).
26. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Fines Five German Banks for Fixing the Price for
the Exchange of Euro-zone Currencies (Dec. 11, 2001) (on file with the author).
27. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings, O.J. L 395, 30 December 1989, p. 1; Council Regulation (EC) No. 1310/97 of 30 June 1997
amending Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ. L 180,
09 July 1997, p. 1; Corrigendum to: Council Regulation (EC) No. 1310/97 of 30June 1997 amending Regu-
lation (EEC) No. 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ. L 40, 13 February
1998, p. 17.
28. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Prohibits Acquisition of Sidel by Tetra Laval Group
(Oct. 30, 2001) (on file with the author).
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had the ability and the incentive to leverage market power in one market into other markets,
in particular through "bundling." The Commission was concerned that this would foreclose
competitors and eventually eliminate competition.
The parties sought to resolve the Commission's concerns by offering commitments, but
these were not acceptable to the Commission. In July 2001, the Commission adopted its
decision prohibiting the merger.
In Tetra Laval/Sidel, the Commission reviewed the acquisition of the French equipment
manufacturer, Sidel, by the packaging company, Tetra Laval. The Commission found Tetra
to be the world's uncontested leader for carton packaging, with an overall market share in
Europe in excess of 80 percent. Sidel, it found, was the leading manufacturer of plastic
PET packaging equipment. The Commission concluded that the combination of Tetra's
dominant position in carton packaging and Sidel's leading position in PET packaging
equipment would provide the merged entity with the ability and incentive to leverage its
dominant position in cartons to gain a dominant position in PET packaging equipment. In
addition, by eliminating Sidel as a competitor in a closely neighbouring market, Tetra's
existing dominant position in cartons would also be strengthened. Furthermore, the Com-
mission took the view that the merged entity's dominant positions in two closely neigh-
bouring markets would be likely to further reinforce one another, to raise barriers to entry,
and to reduce competition in the overall market for the packaging of sensitive products.
Tetra Laval offered undertakings, which the Commission judged insufficient. The merger
was prohibited by a decision adopted in October 2001.
2. Merger Control Regulation - The Ancillary Restraints Notice
In July 2001, the Commission published a Notice on "ancillary restraints."2 9 The Notice
replaces the 1990 Notice 0 and sets out a new approach to ancillary restraints, which are
"restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of concentrations.""
Common examples of "ancillary restraints" in merger agreements are non-competition
clauses, licence agreements, purchase and supply obligations.
Where the Commission decides to clear a concentration under the EC Merger Control
Regulation, that decision also covers the restrictions that are ancillary to the concentration.
Until the adoption of the 2001 Ancillary Restraints Notice, the Commission's practice had
been to review individually the restrictions claimed by the parties to be ancillary to each
notified transaction. The 2001 Notice brings this practice to an end. From now on it will
be the task of the parties and their advisors to determine whether the restraints included
in their merger agreement are really ancillary (thus covered by the Commission's clearance
decision), and are covered by applicable block exemptions, or give rise to issues under
Article 81 of the EC Treaty. The Commission believes that this "self-assessment" approach
is in line with its modernization proposals32 and is consistent with its simplified procedure
for mergers.3
29. Commission Notice on Restrictions Directly Related and Necessary to Concentrations, 2001 OJ. (C
203) 5.
30. Commission Notice Regarding Restrictions Ancillary to Concentrations, 1990 OJ. (C 203) 5.
31. Cf. Merger Control Regulation, 25th Recital, Article 6(l)(b), second paragraph and Article 8(2), second
paragraph, second sentence.
32. Gabriel Castafieda et al., International Antitrust, 35 INT'L LAW. 243, 262 (2001). See International Anti-
trust, Developments in the European Union, 35 INrr'L LAW. 262 (2001).
33. Commission Notice on Simplified Procedure for the Treatment of Certain Concentrations, 2000 OJ.
(C 217) 32; see Castafieda et al., supra note 32, at 257.
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The purpose of the new Ancillary Restraints Notice is to provide guidance on which
restrictions can be regarded as ancillary and to set out the principles to be used in the
analysis of commonly occurring clauses. The most noteworthy features of the guidelines
are:
The duration of "ancillary" non-competition clauses has been limited to two years for cases
involving the protection of goodwill only, and to three years for cases involving the protection
of both know-how and goodwill; and
The duration of non-competition clauses in the case of joint ventures has been limited to
five years in general and may, in any event, not exceed the lifetime of the joint venture if
they are to be considered "ancillary." Clauses with duration in excess of three years need to
be justified, based on the particular circumstances of the case.
3. Merger Control Regulation - The Remedies Notice
In March 2001, the Commission published its Mergers Remedies Notice. 4 The Notice
is intended to provide guidance on the substantive and procedural issues to be considered
by merging parties when proposing remedies to the Commission in order to obtain clear-
ance for their transactions.
The following points in the Notice are noteworthy:
Remedial measures may be offered and implemented in advance of clearance; however, it is
more common for parties to submit commitments, which are implemented within a specific
period following clearance.
* Commitments must be capable of being implemented effectively and within a short period;
they should not require additional monitoring.
* The remedy proposed must restore conditions of effective competition on a permanent basis;
commitments, which are structural in nature, are preferred over other types of commitments.
* Commitments can be accepted in either phase of the merger control procedure. Commit-
ments given in Phase I must be sufficient to rule out the "serious doubts" identified by the
Commission.
* In Phase II, just as it is the Commission's responsibility to show that a transaction will create
or strengthen a dominant position, it is the parties' responsibility to show that the remedies
proposed will eliminate the creation or strengthening of the dominant position identified by
the Commission.
* The Notice provides guidance in respect of specific types of remedies: divestiture, termi-
nation of exclusive agreements, access to infrastructure or key technology, intellectual prop-
erty licences. It also deals with packages of remedies.
* In cases facing prohibition, the Commission believes that divestiture is usually the most
effective way to restore effective competition.
4. Merger Control Regulation - European Commission's Green Paper
In December 2001, the European Commission published a Green Paper on the Review
of the Merger Control Regulation. In the Green Paper, the Commission invited comments
on a number of suggested changes to the current regime, in three distinct areas: jurisdic-
tional, substantive, and procedural.
In relation to jurisdictional issues, the following points are noteworthy:
34. Commission Notice on Remedies Acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, 2001 OJ.
(C 68) 3.
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* The "Community dimension" turnover thresholds are set out in Article 1(2) and the two-
thirds rule are regarded as functioning satisfactorily.
* It is suggested that the "Community dimension" test in Article 1(3) (dating from 1997 when
a second set of lower thresholds were introduced) could be replaced by the automatic transfer
to the Commission of cases subject to national filing in more than three Member States.
* The application of the Article 9 procedure for referral back to a Member State might be
facilitated in the case of merger the effects of which are primarily focused on one Member
State.
* In relation to minority shareholdings and strategic alliances, the Commission's view is that
Article 81 of the EC Treaty remains the most appropriate instrument for assessment.
* The Commission argues that the retention of the Article 2(4) spill-over analysis is justified
and does not accept arguments for the extension of the Regulation to partial function joint
ventures.
* The Commission explores the feasibility of limiting the Regulation's application in relation
to "growth capital/technology investments" venture capital transactions.
* The Green Paper also considers the appropriateness of harmonising the group concept in
Article 5(4) with that of control in Article 3(3).
On substantive issues, the Green Paper initiates a debate on the respective merits of the
current "dominance" test and the US/Australian "substantial lessening of competition" test.
In relation to transactions unlikely to have negative effects on competition, the Commission
indicates its satisfaction with the operation of the Simplified Procedure Notice. It raises the
possibility of the introduction of a block exemption, which could eliminate the obligation
to review, and decide on cases unlikely to have negative effects; some information require-
ment might be retained.
The Green Paper also covers a wide range of procedural issues. The most important
proposal concerns a reorganization of the time schedule for the submission and discussion
of commitments in the first and second phases of investigation, with a view to allowing all
those involved (and not just the parties to the merger) more time to participate in the
settlement discussions. The Green Paper also looks at the triggering event for notification,
the "standstill obligation," electronic filing, direct submission of notification copies to the
Member States, filing fees, the declaration of incompleteness, the undoing of mergers al-
ready implemented, and the calculation of deadlines.
TV. Developments in Mexico
A. EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES INVESTIGATED
1. Access Unreasonably Obstructed by Telmex
On an appeal from a 2000 ruling (Avantel et al vs. Telmex, DE-03-99), the Federal Com-
petition Commission (FCC) affirmed a finding that the Mexican telephone company, Tel-
mex, had engaged in a series of anticompetitive practices designed to obstruct its compet-
itors access to Telmex's telephone signals and inter-urban transport facilities. The FCC
confirmed that Telmex had substantial power in the relevant markets and declared in sub-
stance that it had unreasonably (a) increased the cost of long distance service to discriminate
against competing firms, (b) imposed other unreasonable terms and conditions unilaterally,
and (c) refused to provide requested capacity and imposed service blockages to reduce the
quality of competitors' services. The FCC ordered Telmex to discontinue such practices
and imposed a monetary fine on Telmex.
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2. Pemex, Guilty of Illegal Exclusive Dealing
Following an investigation and proceedings that took more than two years to complete,
the FCC ruled (RA-08-2001) that the Mexican gasoline company, Pemex, had unreasonably
imposed exclusive dealing clauses on its gasoline station franchisees, with the result that
only Pemex's lubricants could be sold at those stations (the only gas stations authorized by
law in Mexico). The FCC confirmed that such contracts were beyond the scope of Pemex's
constitutionally designated monopoly, that it was illegal for Pemex to leverage its market
power in gasoline distribution into the lubricants market, and that competitors were pre-
vented from selling their lubricants to gasoline and diesel stations (a relevant market ac-
cording to the FCC). The antitrust agency ordered Pemex to eliminate the exclusivity
clauses and imposed undisclosed fines.
B. MERGER ENFORCEMENT
1. Televisa Blocked from Acquiring a Major Radio Conglomerate
The FCC confirmed its ruling blocking a transaction through which Televisa would
have acquired 50.01 percent of the capital stock of Grupo Acir, the largest radio con-
glomerate in Mexico. The FCC focused principally on two issues: (a) the transaction
would have allowed Televisa, the largest Mexican television network, to control the most
significant radio broadcasting firm in Mexico: Televisa already accounts for 55 percent of
advertising sales through electronic media, and (b) through the control of both the most
important television and radio stations, Televisa could bundle multimedia advertising
schemes and could impose unreasonable terms and conditions upon its clients, to the
detriment of competition.
2. Grocery Stores's Vouchers Firm Declared to be an Illegal Concentration
The FCC ruled that the formation of Prestaciones Universales (PU), a firm created by
the largest grocery and department stores as a vehicle for the distribution and marketing
of vouchers for the purchase of merchandise within their chains, was an illegal concentra-
tion. The FCC found that, through PU, the stores could disadvantage consumers, would
have the ability to act jointly to unfairly displace firms offering competing vouchers, and
could exert anticompetitive pressure on firms from which the stores obtain merchandise.
The FCC ordered the dissolution of PU.
C. MEXICAN COMPETITION POLICY TRENDS
In a recent speech before the Mexican Bar, the Chairman of the FCC, Fernando Sinchez
Ugarte, discussed the future of Mexican antitrust policy. The speech was noteworthy for
several reasons: there is a new federal administration in power, the FCC is an independent
agency, and the FCC has opposed the government on a number of important issues (e.g.,
Aeromexico-Mexicano was not permitted to be sold as a combined package). The issues
addressed by the FCC Chairman were:
Principles: What is the ideal reach of competition policy? What should be the scope of the
powers entrusted to the enforcement agency? Does the current competition statute prevent
or inhibit future investment?
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* Potential areas for reform: strengthening the FCC's current legal powers, restructuring pro-
cedures to maximize efficiency, and reinforcing competition policy within regulated sectors.
* Continuity: President Fox will be appointing three new commissioners (out of five) during
his term in office. What can be expected?
* FCC rulings before federal courts: there are over 200 proceedings currently being litigated,
challenging FCC decisions and orders (five before the Supreme Court). What will the future
bring to this growing trend?
V. Developments in New Zealand
A. INTRODUCTION
The year 2001 was arguably the most significant year in New Zealand competition law
since the enactment of the Commerce Act (Act) in 1986. There was an unprecedented level
of legislative activity, including major amendments to the Act (such as new business acqui-
sition provisions and further regulation of the electricity industry) and the introduction of
industry-specific legislation for the dairy and telecommunications industries. These changes
greatly increased the role of the Commerce Commission (Commission), New Zealand's
competition regulator. The Commission also had a busy year, in which it issued proceedings
against British American Tobacco, conducted an inquiry into airport pricing charges (and
issued a subsequent report), published its Practice Note No. 4 (Practice Note) 5 setting out
its approach to the new business acquisition provisions, published a "Compliance" news-
letter outlining its new role and responsibilities in the dairy industry, appointed economic
experts and released a discussion paper to assist it with its new role in telecommunications,
and released a paper on its approach to the valuation and audit of large electricity lines
businesses as part of its new responsibilities in monitoring electricity prices. The year also
saw two important cases decided by the Court of Appeal, the INZCO predatory pricing case
and the Southern Cross/Aetna merger decision.
As foreshadowed in last year's report,3 6 New Zealand has clearly moved from "generic"
competition law (also known as "light handed regulation") to more sector-specific legisla-
tion and stronger enforcement action.
B. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
1. The Commerce Act
On May 26, 2001, the Commerce Amendment Act 2001 came into force, significantly
amending the Act. Key changes included: the lowering of the threshold for business ac-
quisitions (mergers), an amendment to the misuse of market power provisions, and an
increase in penalties. The Act also now provides for the Commission to issue "cease and
desist" orders (but the relevant amendments have not yet come into force) and the price
control provisions in the Act are strengthened.
Previously, business acquisitions were prohibited if they were likely to result in the ac-
quisition or strengthening of "market dominance." The new test is whether the acquisition
35. Commerce Commission Practice Note No. 4 -The Commission's approach to adjudicating on business
acquisitions under the changed threshold in section 47-a test of substantially lessening competition.
36. Castafieda et al., supra note 32, at 272.
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has the effect or likely effect of "substantially lessening competition" (SLC) in a market.
This test was adopted to lower the threshold for business acquisitions (which had been seen
as too high) and to adopt the same test as Australia, New Zealand's largest trading partner.
The Commission's new Practice Note provides guidance on its approach to the new test,
with the Commission equating a SLC with a strengthening of market power. The Practice
Note also sets out the Commission's "safe harbors;" post-acquisition market shares where
the Commission considers that a business acquisition is unlikely to substantially lessen
competition. These are where either (a) the market share of the combined entity is less than
about 40 percent, unless there is a "concentrated market" (for example, where the combined
market share of the largest three firms in the market is around 70 percent or more) or
(b) there is a "concentrated market," the combined market share of the three largest firms
in the market is less than about 20 percent. The first safe harbor (a) relates to unilateral
market power, whereas the second safe harbor (b) relates to coordinated market power
(explicit cartels or tacit collusion). These safe harbors are only administrative guidelines
and it is possible that they could be tested in court.
The previous provision relating to misuse of market power prohibited parties with a
"dominant position in the market" from "using" that position for certain anti-competitive
purposes. The new provision prohibits parties with a "substantial degree of power in the
market" from "taking advantage" of that power for those anti-competitive purposes. The
new law also allows for anti-competitive purpose to be inferred from relevant conduct and
circumstances, codifying existing case law.
Penalties have been increased. The maximum penalty for companies for each breach of
the restrictive trade practices (for example, non-business acquisition) provisions have been
increased to the greater of NZ$10 million or three times the value of any actual or expected
commercial gain. Where the commercial gain is not known, the penalty is 10 percent of
the turnover of the New Zealand body corporate and any (domestic) interconnected bodies
corporate. Maximum penalties for business acquisitions remain at NZ$5m per offence. The
maximum penalty for individuals remains at NZ$0.5m but courts must impose penalties
on individuals who breach restrictive trade practices provisions, unless there is a good reason
for not doing so.
2. Dairy Industry Restructuring Act 2001
The Dairy Industry Restructuring Act 2001 (DIRA) provided for the regulatory and
structural reform of the dairy industry, authorizing the amalgamation of New Zealand's
two largest dairy co-operatives (New Zealand Co-operative Dairy Company Ltd. and Kiwi
Co-operative Dairies Ltd.) into the new Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited (Fonterra).
Fonterra now also owns the vast majority of all the shares in the New Zealand Dairy Board,
which previously had an export monopoly and had been jointly owned by the exporting
dairy companies. In order to address concerns that Fonterra might have substantial market
power in the domestic dairy markets, the DIRA provides for certain safeguards and gives
the Commission an additional regulatory and enforcement role. The Commission can now
make determinations in response to applications from parties in dispute with Fonterra con-
cerning exit and/or entry of its shareholders (Fonterra being a "co-operative" company,
owned by its suppliers), or any regulations made under the DIRA (for example, relating to
the supply and pricing of raw milk to independent processors) and making determinations
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to resolve such disputes. It can also initiate an investigation in response to complaints and/
or on the basis of its own monitoring of the industry, conduct investigations into any be-
havior by Fonterra that appears to breach those conditions, or any regulations made under
the DIRA.
C. MERGER ACTIVITY
Despite New Zealand's voluntary pre-notification regime and the slowdown in merger
activity internationally, a relatively large number of applications for clearance were filed in
2001. Thirty-seven applications for clearance were made in 2001, up from thirty-two the
previous year. Of these, twenty-eight were cleared, two were withdrawn, three were de-
clined and four were undecided at the end of the year. Three applications from the previous
year were cleared in 2001 and one such application was declined. The increase in appli-
cations was, in part, driven by a desire to make applications prior to the implementation of
the more stringent business acquisitions test and the subsequent desire to have the comfort
(and protection) of a formal clearance, given the uncertainty as to how the new test would
be applied. The Commission had publicly stated that applications for clearance received
before the new law change took effect would be considered under the test applying at the
date of the application (i.e., dominance) rather than the date of the determination (when
the SLC test would apply). This led to the Commission having eleven applications in pro-
cess at once, at the time the highest number in ten years. The Commission's approach was,
however, successfully challenged in one decision involving supermarkets (discussed below)
leading the Government to pass the Commerce Clearance Validation AmendmentAct2001.
This legislation provided that all of the Commission decisions (which had all been clear-
ances) were valid, except for the supermarkets merger.
1. The Supermarkets Case - Progressive/Woolworths
In May 2001, the Progressive supermarket chain sought clearance to acquire the Wool-
worths supermarket chain, expecting to have the acquisition considered under the domi-
nance test. Clearance was granted on July 13, 2001,31 after the new SLC test had taken
effect. Foodstuffs, the third major national supermarket chain, objected to this and issued
proceedings in the High Court against Progressive and the Commission. The High Court38
agreed with the Commission's approach, but Foodstuffs appealed this decision to the Court
of Appeal. The appeal court considered that the Commission should have applied the test
at the date the decision was made (the SLC test) and set aside the clearance.39 This placed
Progressive and the other ten parties, which had obtained clearances since the law change,
in an uncertain position, given that the Commission had provided clearances under the
"wrong" test. As noted above, the situation was subsequently remedied by the passing of
the Commerce (Clearance Validation) Amendment Act 2001. The final blow for Progressive
was the Commission's refusal to grant clearance to its subsequent application for clearance
37. Progressive Enterprises Ltd. and Woolworths (New Zealand) Ltd., Commerce Commission Decision
No 438, 13 July 2001 (N.Z.).
38. Foodstuffs (Auckland) Ltd. v. Commerce Comm'n, CL14/01 (2001).
39. Foodstuffs (Auckland) Ltd. v. Commerce Comm'n, CA163/01 (2001).
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under the new SLC test (for reasons described below).4 It appears likely that Progressive
will appeal the Court of Appeal's decision to the Privy Council (New Zealand's ultimate
appeals court).
2. Southern Cross' Acquisition of Aetna Health41
In last year's edition,42 we outlined the Commission's decision to decline clearance for
the proposed acquisition by Southern Cross (the country's largest private health insurer)
of the New Zealand operations of Aetna.41 Southern Cross appealed that decision to the
High Court, which allowed the appeal, concluding that the Commission ought to have
cleared the proposed acquisition without the need for any divestment,- a decision that the
Commission then appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the
Commission's appeal, 4 concluding (on the balance of probabilities) that the merged
Southern Cross/Aetna would not be likely to be in a dominant position in the health in-
surance market, i.e., it would not have the ability to price or otherwise behave in a anti-
competitive manner. Importantly, the Court reaffirmed that barriers to entry/expansion
were fundamental to a finding of dominance, noting the Commission's findings of low
barriers to entry and expansion. The Court rejected the Commission's argument that econ-
omies of scale enjoyed by the merged entity would constitute a significant barrier to ex-
pansion if the merged entity attempted to act anti-competitively. In doing so, it was noted
that it was not sufficient simply to show economies of scale to establish a barrier to entry-
economies of scale only constitute a barrier to entry when the minimum size for an efficient
firm is very large relative to the size of the market. The Court accepted that the market
shares had remained reasonably static, but that this may simply have reflected the fact that
the market was contestable and efficient.
3. Business Acquisitions Under the New Regime
In 2001, the Commission considered sixteen applications under the new SLC test in-
cluding, for example, the sale by British Telecommunications of CLEAR Communications
to TelstraSaturn, and the Progressive/Woolworths supermarkets application discussed
above. While the public copies of the Commission's decisions remove sensitive market share
information, it seems clear that a number of the applications involved aggregations of mar-
ket shares outside the Commission's "safe harbors." Despite this, the Commission has con-
sistently applied the process set out in its Practice Note, only finding an SLC where there
has been a strengthening of market power. In the Commission's view, this will only arise
where the combined entity has the sustainable ability to raise price and/or reduce product
quality or service, relative to what would have occurred in the absence of the acquisition.
The anticipated price increase (or reduction in quality or service) has to be both material
and sustained for a period of at least two years.
40. Progressive Enterprises Ltd. and Woolworths (New Zealand) Ltd., Commerce Commission Decision
No. 448, 14th of December 2001 (N.Z.).
41. The Southern Cross and Medical Care Society and Aetna Health (N.Z.) Ltd., Commerce Commission
Decision No. 399, 25th of August 2000 (N.Z.).
42. Castafieda et al., supra note 32, at 273.
43. Id.
44. S. Cross Med. Care Soc'y v. Commerce Comm'n (2001) 10 TCLR 25.
45. Commerce Comm'n. v. S. Cross Med. Care Soc'y, CA 89/01 (2001). The authors disclose that they
were acting as counsel for Southern Cross throughout the process.
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D. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
1. Predatory Pricing - the INZCO Decision
In last year's report,46 we outlined the case where the High Court imposed a penalty of
NZ$525,000 on INZCO for "predatory pricing." While INZCO had priced "below cost,"
it had effectively matched the price offered by a more efficient new entrant (which was
operating profitably). There was no evidence that INZCO had any intention to recoup its
losses by raising prices at a later stage. Nevertheless, the court had held that this constituted
a use of INZCO's dominant market position for a prohibited anti-competitive purpose (as
the test was then stood).
This year, the Court of Appeal rejected INZCO's appeal against the High Court's de-
cision.47 In doing so, the court held that dominance had to be assessed by looking at the
overall commercial situation-here the finding of dominance appears to have been based
largely on the strong relationship INZCO had with its merchants, together with its strong
brand name and barriers to entry. It is significant to note that the court found dominance
despite the fact that the "target" of the pricing behavior had gained 30 percent market share
in the local geographic market. The court was not swayed by the target's ease of entry and
expansion in a relatively short period. Even though matching prices might be regarded as
competitive behavior, when considering whether INZCO had "used" dominance for a "pro-
hibited" purpose, the court appeared to apply a different test for dominant companies and
seemed strongly influenced by the apparent cross-subsidisation by INZCO from its higher
margin products and unhelpful "rhetoric" in its internal documents.
2. British American Tobacco Merger
In 2001, the Commission commenced court action against British American Tobacco
Holdings (NZ) Limited (BAT) alleging that the acquisition by BAT of WD & HO Wills
(New Zealand) Limited (Wills NZ) in 1999 contravened the business acquisition provisions
of the Act. Despite there being substantial international competitors (albeit with a relatively
smaller presence in New Zealand), the Commission appears to be alleging that the merged
entity would not in fact be constrained by those competitors due to the prohibition on
cigarette advertising in New Zealand (which would allegedly make existing and potential
competitors unable to attract new customers so as to increase their market share). The
proceeding is still at an early stage. If the court subsequently finds that BAT breached the
Act, then it could order BAT to divest itself of Wills NZ, and could also impose a wide
range of orders.
VI. Developments in the United States
A. PROCEDURAL LAw
In 2001, United States federal courts continued to hold that the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act" bars antitrust claims that do not arise out of direct, substantial, and
46. Castafieda et al., supra note 32, at 274.
47. Carter Holt Harvey Bldg. Products Group Ltd. v. Commerce Conm'n, CA 180/00 and CA 184/00,
(2001).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
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reasonably foreseeable effects on United States commerce. 49 In the context of litigation
arising out of international cartels, courts have held that plaintiffs who purchased products
abroad at allegedly supracompetitive prices may not premise U.S. jurisdiction upon the fact
that the conspiracy as a whole had an effect on United States commerce, unless these
domestic effects specifically "gave rise" to the plaintiffs' injury.5 0
In Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac, vof, a federal appeals court dismissed an
action filed by a Norwegian oil company against the members of an alleged cartel providing
heavy-lift barge services in various regions of the world."' The plaintiff, who had contracted
for the relevant services in the North Sea, argued that the market for heavy-lift services was
a global market and that the defendants were able to maintain anticompetitive pricing in the
United States market due to an overall market allocation scheme encompassing the entire
globe (including the North Sea).52 The appeals court ruled, however, that even if the defen-
dants' conspiracy had resulted in supracompetitive prices in the United States, jurisdiction
was lacking because the inflated U.S. prices did not "give rise" to the plaintiff's claims."
B. CARTEL ENFORCEMENT
In 2 001, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) continued to engage in vigorous
and successful criminal prosecutions of foreign companies and individuals involved in cartel
behavior affecting the United States market. Following up on a number of guilty pleas
entered into in 2000, the DOJ secured indictments of four top executives ofJapanese chem-
ical companies in the food preservatives industry and reached a plea agreement with the
employer of three of them, Ueno Fine Chemicals Industry Ltd.54 Ueno's fine of $11 million
brought the total dollar value of fines imposed in the investigation to $130 million. The
DOJ also continued its prosecution of an alleged price-fixing conspiracy in the auction
house industry, indicting the former Chairmen of Sotheby's and Christie's. 51
DOJ investigations have continued to result in significant fines for foreign companies
accused of forming cartels in violation of the U.S. antitrust laws. Mitsubishi Corporation
was convicted of participation in an international graphite electrodes price-fixing cartel and
49. See, e.g., Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac vof, 241 F.3d 420, 428-29 (5th Cir. 2001);
Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (D. Md. 2001).
50. See, e.g., Sniadio v. Bank Austria AG, 174 F. Supp. 2d 159, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Empagran, S.A. v. F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., Civ. No. 00-1686 (TFH), at 10 (D.D.C. June 7,2001).
51. See Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 431.
52. Id. at 425.
53. Id. at 427. In Prewitt Enterprises, Inc. v. OPEC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4141 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 21, 2001),
the district court ruled that it had jurisdiction over antitrust claims by U.S,-based petroleum purchasers against
OPEC because of the effects of OPEC's activities in the United States. See 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4141 at
* 18. The court also held that (i) OPEC's output restrictions and related price strategies wereperse illegal under
the U.S. antitrust laws, and (ii) OPEC's member states were not entitled to immunity from suit under the
principles of sovereign immunity or the act of state doctrine because the relevant activities undertaken were
commercial in nature. See id. at *20-*24.
54. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Four Japanese Executives Indicted in Price-Fixing Conspiracy (an. 23,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressjreleases/2001/7310.htm.
55. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Former Chairmen Of Sotheby's And Christie's Auction Houses Indicted
In International Price-Fixing Conspiracy (May 2, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
pressreleases/2001/8128.htm. The former Sotheby's Chairman was subsequently convicted after a trial in the
Southern District of New York.
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was fined $134 million-the fourth largest fine ever imposed in an antitrust case.56 A Swiss
company based in Milan was fined $53 million after pleading guilty to participation in a
conspiracy to rig bids on a construction contract funded by the United States Agency for
International Development in the Republic of Egypt." Further examples of the DOJ's
international reach include the plea agreement by Dutch chemical company Akzo Nobel
Chemicals BV, subjecting it to a $12 million fine for participating in a conspiracy to fix the
price of monochloroacetic acid," s and the plea agreements by two Japanese companies and
one Korean company resulting in over $9 million in fines for participating in a cartel in
the food flavoring industry. 9
The DOJ continued its practice of prosecuting foreign nationals residing abroad who
were accused of violating U.S. antitrust laws. In connection with its investigation of a cartel
in the isostatic graphite industry, the DOJ secured the first plea agreement where ajapanese
executive agreed to the possibility of a prison sentence for the violation of U.S. antitrust
laws. 6° The DOJ followed up a few months later with three more indictments of Japan-
based executives. 61 In connection with the monochloroacetic acid cartel investigation, a plea
agreement was reached with a Swedish executive of Akzo Nobel who agreed to a three-
month prison sentence and a $20,000 fine.62
C. MERGER ENFORCEMENT
In 2001, international mergers affecting competition in the United States continued to
receive scrutiny by the U.S. antitrust agencies. Pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976,61 the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reviewed
numerous international mergers and entered into a number of consent decrees to address
potential anticompetitive effects.
The U.S. antitrust agencies continue to review-and challenge-important international
mergers where anticompetitive U.S. effects are anticipated, even when the transaction in-
volved non-U.S. companies. In October 2001, the FTC authorized a challenge to the pro-
posed acquisition of Seagram Wine and Spirits, owned by the French concern Vivendi
56. Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, Mitsubishi Corporation Fined $134 Million For Its Role In International
Price-Fixing Cartel (May 10, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2001/
8186.htm.
57. Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, Abb Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. Subsidiary Pleads Guilty To Bid Rigging
On USAID Construction Contract In Egypt, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressjreleases/2001/
7984.htm.
58. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Dutch Chemical Giant Akzo Nobel Agrees To Plead Guilty And Pay
$12 Million Fine For Its Role In Criminal Antitrust Conspiracy (June 27, 2001), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2001/8468.htm.
59. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Three International Companies To Plead Guilty In Food Flavoring
Cartel (Aug. 27, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2001/8918.htm.
60. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Executive And U.S. Subsidiary Of Japanese Manufacturer Agree To
Plead Guilty To International Price-Fixing Conspiracy Charges (Feb. 14, 2001), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2001/7476.htm.The executive also agreed to pay a $10,000 fine.
61. Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, Three Japanese Executives Indicted in Price-Fixing Conspiracy (July25,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publidpressreleases/2001/8678.htm.
62. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Dutch Chemical Giant Akzo Nobel Agrees To Plead Guilty And Pay
$12 Million Fine For Its Role In Criminal Antitrust Conspiracy (une 27, 2001), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2001/8468.htm.
63. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1997), amended by P. L.
No. 106-553 (Dec. 21, 2000), 114 Stat. 2762.
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Universal S.A., by Diageo Plc and Pernod Ricard S.A. (British and French, respectively).64
The FTC alleged, among other things, that the transaction would result in anticompetitive
concentration in the market for rum products. In December 2001, after Diageo agreed to
a number of conditions, including the divestiture of one of its own brands of rum, the FTC
allowed the transaction to proceed. 65
Cooperation between the United States and foreign competition authorities continued
in 2001. For example, in September 2001, the FTC negotiated a consent decree in con-
nection with the proposal by Finnish company Metso Oyj's to acquire Svedala Industri AB,
a Swedish company, for approximately $1.6 billion.66 Concerned that the transaction would
decrease competition in the rock processing equipment market, which the FTC considered
to be a global market, the FTC required the parties to divest various worldwide businesses
to two competing finns (also non-U.S. companies). In connection with its review of the
transaction, the FTC stated that it cooperated, not only with the European Commission
(pursuant to the bilateral treaty), but also with the competition authorities of Australia,
Canada, and South Africa.
U.S. agency officials have reported that the close working relationship that has developed
between the U.S. antitrust agencies and their counterparts in Europe has resulted in sig-
nificant convergence in analytical approaches to cases of mutual concern. 6' However, where
differing approaches remain (highlighted in 2001 by the contrasting merger analyses un-
dertaken with respect to the proposed acquisition of Honeywell International, Inc. by Gen-
eral Electric), officials have not hesitated to point out their desire for further convergence. 6 s
D. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
In October 2001, the U.S. antitrust agencies announced the creation of a new Interna-
tional Competition Network (ICN) to provide a venue where senior antitrust officials from
numerous nations can work to reach consensus on proposals for procedural and substantive
convergence in antitrust enforcement. 69 Recognizing the global proliferation of antitrust
regimes, the ICN is intended to contribute to the ability of the member nations to reduce
inconsistent outcomes, decrease unnecessary procedural burdens, and make antitrust en-
forcement more efficient and effective. The concept for the ICN grew out of the recom-
mendations of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee.'
64. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Authorizes Suit to Block Joint Acquisition of Seagram
Spirits and Wine by Diageo PLC and Pernod Ricard S.A. (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2001/l0/diageo.htm.
65. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, With Conditions, FTC Approves Joint Acquisition of Seagram
Spirits and Wine by Diageo PLC and Pernod Ricard S.A. (Dec. 19, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2001/12/diageo.htm.
66. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Settlement Preserves Competition in Global Markets for
Rock Processing Equipment (Sept. 7, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/09/metso.htm.
67. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Chairman Muris Stresses Commitment to Cooper-
ation with European Commission (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.ft.gov/opa/2001/1 1/euus.htm.
68. See, e.g., id.; Charles A. James, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't ofJustice, International Antitrust
in the Bush Administration, remarks before Canadian Bar Ass'n (Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/91 00.htm.
69. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, U.S. and Foreign Antitrust Officials Launch International Compe-
tition Network (Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2001/9400.htm.
70. See Press Release, Attorney General Janet Reno, AAG Joel I. Klein Issue Statements about International
Competition Advisory Committee Report (Feb. 28, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/
4275.htm.
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